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INTRODUCTION 
There is one area in which Craigslist Inc. appears particularly invested 
these days: its legal bills. Notoriously cutthroat, this online classified 
marketplace has steadfastly clung to its bare-boned business blueprint 
while resisting any form of growth or innovation over the years.1 
Craigslist has not, however, shied away from taking on its would-be 
competitors in court, oftentimes those attempting only to “add[] a layer 
                                                                                                                     
 * First, a very special thanks to the talented and dedicated editorial staff of the Florida 
Law Review for the thoughtful work they have done to improve this piece, and to Trace Jackson 
and Marla Spector for making this possible. I would also like to thank Professor Dennis Calfee 
for guiding me through the dark times and for being my conscience and confidante, always. And 
finally, to my incredible parents, for their blind, unquestioning support, to my former roommate 
and friend Michael Polatsek, for paying the rent on time, and to my lovely wife Deborah, for 
tolerating this madness much longer than I thought possible. All rights reserved; all wrongs 
revenged. 
 1. See Keith Patrick, How Craigslist Makes Money, HOUS. CHRON., 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/craigslist-money-27287.html (last visited June 27, 2015) (noting 
that Craigslist is considering other revenue streams while remaining hesitant due to fears of taking 
away “from the quality of the site”); see also Gary Wolf, Why Craigslist Is Such a Mess, WIRED 
(Aug. 24, 2009), http://archive.wired.com/entertainment/theweb/magazine/17-09/ff_craigslist 
(“Besides offering nearly all of its features for free, it scorns advertising, refuses investment, 
ignores design, and does not innovate. Ordinarily, a company that showed such complete disdain 
for the normal rules of business would be vulnerable to competition, but [C]raigslist has no serious 
rivals. The glory of the site is its size and its price.”). 
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of value” to the Craigslist formula.2 Not surprisingly, Craigslist’s arsenal 
of litigation weapons has become quite vast in recent years: claims arising 
under the Copyright Act, the Lanham Act, and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA), as well as claims of unjust enrichment, conspiracy, 
and even trespass to chattel,3 all aimed at scrappy upstarts sporting a 
fraction of Craigslist’s resources. Many of these rival companies have 
employed “web scrapers” to aggregate publicly available data on 
Craigslist’s servers and then repackage or otherwise make available this 
content for third-party users.4 In some cases, this activity clearly 
constitutes misappropriation or theft, but generalizing these companies’ 
motives is tricky. Very often these competing companies appear to be 
simply trying to enhance and augment the Craigslist model, which is a 
desirable result in a free and unfettered market. 
Several recent court orders in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California signal a major early victory for Craigslist over these 
web scrapers and data aggregators, even though much of the early media 
attention has centered on where Craigslist’s lawsuit fell short: the 
copyright infringement claims.5 Indeed, what was lost on many 
mainstream commentators (but certainly not legal bloggers6) is that the 
                                                                                                                     
 2. Mike Masnick, Craigslist’s Abuse of Copyright and the CFAA to Attack Websites That 
Make Craigslist Better Is a Disgrace, TECHDIRT (May 1, 2013, 9:29 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/ articles/20130501/04342822905/craigslists-abuse-copyright-
cfaa-to-attack-websites-that-make-craigslist-better-is-disgrace.shtml; see Dani Fankhauser, 
Why the Web Hasn’t Birthed a Prettier Craigslist, MASHABLE (Feb. 17, 2013), 
http://mashable.com/2013/02/17/prettier-craigslist (“The site certainly has the funds to hire top-
notch interaction designers to build a superior product, as the original Craigslist must have been 
for users in 1995. But instead, it focuses resources on fighting for legal domination over 
competitors.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Complaint at 8–15, Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013) (No. CV-12-3816). 
 4. See Craigslist Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d at 966. (“Craigslist alleges that 3Taps copies (or 
‘scrapes’) all content posted to Craigslist in real time, directly from the Craigslist website. 3Taps 
markets [an Application Programming Interface] to allow third parties to access large amounts of 
content from Craigslist . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 5. E.g., Derek Khanna, Craigslist’s Allegations of “Copyright” Violations Thrown Out, 
FORBES (Apr. 30, 2013, 7:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/derekkhanna/2013/04/30/
craigslists-allegations-of-copyright-violations-thrown-out. 
6.See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Craigslist’s Anti-Consumer Lawsuit Threatens to Break Internet 
Law, FORBES (May 23, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013
/05/23/craigslists-anti-consumer-lawsuit-threatens-to-break-internet-law; see also Jam Kotenko, 
Padmapper and 3Taps Win Copyright Case Against Craigslist, but the Battle Isn’t Over, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (May 1, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/padmapper-wins-copyright-case-
against-craigslist-but-still-faces-other-claims/#!IxRnz (noting that, even after the rulings on 
copyright infringement, an apartment listing site and its data collector and provider still faced 
potential charges based on the CFAA); Adi Robertson, Craigslist Lawsuit Ruling Says Evading 
an IP Address Block Can Violate Anti-Hacking Laws, VERGE (Aug. 19, 2013, 11:27 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/8/19/4636154/craigslist-ruling-says-evading-ip-address-
block-violates-cfaa (focusing on the CFAA claims). 
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Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc. orders continue to perpetuate the absurd 
application of the CFAA to online “intrusion,” specifically to Craigslist’s 
competitors’ web scraping activities. The April and August 2013 orders 
on the defendants’ motions to dismiss found these activities actionable 
under the CFAA,7 which is alarming because the scraped data in question 
was available on freely accessible, public websites. Moreover, these 
orders subvert a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, United States v. Nosal,8 which had narrowed the 
application of the CFAA and its use as a weapon of private enforcement 
against web scrapers and other data aggregators.9 In brief, Nosal stands 
for the proposition that users’ violations of a website’s “Terms of Use” 
(TOU) could not alone form the basis of CFAA liability.10 The Nosal case 
is significant because it seemingly halted the runaway train that the 
CFAA had become in California. Further, it marked a departure from 
other circuits by offering a lean, sensible interpretation of the CFAA’s 
thorniest provision: what activities constitute “unauthorized access.” 
However, the Craigslist orders still leave open questions about whether 
Nosal was the great panacea that it first appeared to be, or if it managed 
to change anything at all.  
While there are causes of action that ought to be (and are) available to 
plaintiffs wishing to guard against unwanted intrusion, CFAA civil 
actions should not be among them. This cause of action is poorly suited 
to address complex property issues in the digital age, and it may 
simultaneously chill web innovation and foster anticompetitive behavior 
in the market. While it is unclear whether the Northern District of 
California will ever reach the merits in Craigslist, these early decisions 
suggest that the court may have misapplied Nosal, or may be poised to 
misapply it in the future. While Nosal seemed to take a forward step in 
squaring the circle—particularly with regard to the CFAA’s more 
troubling provisions—the Northern District’s misguided application of 
the CFAA post-Nosal illustrates deeper infirmities within the CFAA. 
Indeed, courts cannot and should not stretch the CFAA to cover 
unanticipated and uncontemplated forms of technology, and in this regard 
the CFAA is ripe for a simple statutory fix. A CFAA “safe harbor” of 
sorts, borrowed from language found in a related statute, would help 
modernize a statute that has, over time, swept within its ambit a new class 
of unintended defendants.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 7. See Craigslist, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (April 2013 order granting in part and denying in 
part motions to dismiss); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 
2013) (August 2013 order denying motion to dismiss CFAA count).  
 8. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 9. Id. at 863. 
 10. See id.  
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Part I of this Comment begins by tracking the CFAA’s evolution in 
the Ninth Circuit as applied in the internet realm. Part II examines the 
Nosal decision and whether the court properly applied it in Craigslist. 
Part II also examines the implications for web start-ups seeking to exploit 
existing, publicly available data if the Northern District eventually holds 
against 3Taps Inc. at trial or on summary judgment. Finally, Part III 
proposes a statutory solution that creates a safe harbor within the CFAA 
for users accessing public computer systems, effectively removing these 
defendants from the purview of the CFAA. This Comment focuses on 
developments principally in the Ninth Circuit, as California web 
companies are perhaps most poised to litigate these types of issues. 
I.  EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE 
ACT IN THE INTERNET CONTEXT 
Congress enacted the CFAA11 in 1986 with the goal of protecting “a 
vast array of property that, in many cases, is wholly unprotected against 
crime” given the vast “proliferation of computers and computer data.”12 
Primarily a criminal statute targeting computer hackers, the CFAA also 
provides for a civil cause of action for “[a]ny person who suffers damage 
or loss by reason of a violation of this section” for compensatory damages 
and injunctive relief.13 Congress appeared animated by a desire to prevent 
theft and misappropriation of guarded data, but also that untrammeled 
access onto another’s computer system itself posed a serious independent 
threat.14  
Most CFAA private causes of action turn on the operation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), the statute’s key provision: “Whoever . . . knowingly 
and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, or exceeds authorized access . . . shall be punished.”15 The 
statute somewhat circularly defines “exceeds authorized access” as “to 
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or 
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to 
obtain or alter.”16 The statute, however, does not clarify the meaning of 
“unauthorized access.” These ambiguities and omissions have prompted 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
 12. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2 (1986) [hereinafter Senate Report]; see also Robert D. Sowell, 
Comment, Misuse of Information Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: On What Side of 
the Circuit Split will the Second and Third Circuits Wind Up?, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1747, 1747–49 
(2014) (providing background on the legislative history of the CFAA). 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012). 
 14. See Senate Report, supra note 12, at 10 (“Mere trespasses onto someone else’s computer 
system can cost the system provider a ‘port’ or access channel that he might otherwise be making 
available for a fee to an authorized user.”). 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012). 
 16. Id. § 1030(e)(6). 
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much debate among academics and the courts.17 
Over time, due to the transformation of the technological landscape, 
courts have applied the CFAA more frequently in the internet realm and 
further outside the strict “hacking” context. Indeed, with the addition of 
the civil cause of action in 1994, the CFAA has morphed into an 
expansive right of private enforcement against all forms of digital 
intrusion.18 A number of cases in the Ninth Circuit illustrate the CFAA’s 
expansive reach. This Comment spotlights the following cases because 
their facts are the most similar to the web scraping activity at issue in 
Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc. Further, many of these cases examine issues 
of first impression, as they involve nascent and novel technologies 
employed to either access or extract data from web servers.19 At the 
outset, note that many of these cases never proceeded past either the Rule 
12(b)(6)20 or summary judgment stage, likely due to disparities in 
resources between plaintiffs and defendants. Although there is a lack of 
decisions on the ultimate merits of these claims, these preliminary orders 
still shed considerable light on California courts’ approach to CFAA 
claims. 
In 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
granted Ticketmaster LLC’s motion for a preliminary injunction against 
RMG Technologies premised on various federal and state law claims.21 
Defendant RMG employed a web scraping-like technology known as the 
“Ticket Broker Acquisition Tool” (TBAT), which Ticketmaster alleged 
was an “automatic device[]” prohibited by the site’s TOU.22 Website 
TOUs typically take the form of “‘browsewrap’ licenses, in which the 
user does not see the contract at all but in which the license terms provide 
that using a Web site constitutes agreement to a contract.”23 Put 
differently, a website user may at times implicitly assent to the site’s TOU 
without having read it. Courts are still divided, however, on whether 
                                                                                                                     
 17. E.g., Andrew T. Hernacki, Comment, A Vague Law in a Smartphone World: Limiting 
the Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 
1543, 1554–55 (2012) (“Over the past decade, three distinct approaches have emerged for how to 
interpret and apply what it means to access a computer without, or in excess of, authorization: (1) 
the contract-based approach; (2) the agency-based approach; and (3) the code-based approach.”). 
 18. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age, 44 
TULSA L. REV. 677, 693–94 (2009). 
 19. As this Comment argues, this is a fundamental problem with applying the CFAA to 
these types of actions. See infra Part II. 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).  
 21. Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(order granting a preliminary injunction). The plaintiff brought the motion for preliminary 
injunction based on five claims, including a CFAA claim. Id. While the CFAA claim failed 
because it did not meet the monetary damage threshold, the court granted the motion for 
preliminary injunction on the basis of the plaintiff’s remaining claims. Id. at 1113.  
 22. Id. at 1102–03. 
 23. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006).  
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TOUs are enforceable when lacking some affirmative action on the part 
of the user.24  
Ticketmaster claimed that the defendant’s automated tool not only 
violated its TOU, but also allowed the defendant to bypass the site’s 
CAPTCHA25 and flood the site with unwanted queries.26 While the 
court’s analysis of the plaintiff’s CFAA claim is scant, the court suggests 
that the facts alleged were sufficient to maintain an “unauthorized access” 
claim under § 1030(a)(4).27 The court stated, “It appears likely that 
Plaintiff will be able to prove that Defendant gained unauthorized access 
to, and/or exceeded authorized access to, Plaintiff’s protected computers” 
based on the TBAT’s culling reams of data via automatic search 
queries.28 In other words, based on a preliminary sketch of the facts, it 
appears that the court was satisfied that the defendant’s conduct—
violating Ticketmaster’s TOU and skirting the CAPTCHA checkpoint—
constituted actionable “unauthorized access” under § 1030(a)(4). 
Two years later, eBay Inc. brought CFAA and RICO29 claims against 
a number of defendants, alleging that they engaged in an elaborate 
“cookie stuffing” scheme to fraudulently redirect advertising revenue to 
themselves.30 In essence, the scheme involved displacing legitimate 
cookies used to track user behavior and “revenue actions” on eBay’s site 
with fraudulent cookies crediting the defendants for any user revenue 
action.31 Much like web scraping, the activity in question appeared to 
involve user proxies,32 was to a degree automated, and entailed otherwise 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Compare Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 WL 756610, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (holding that the site’s TOU was binding in this case, where the 
defendant had actual or imputed knowledge of the plaintiff’s terms when using the website), with 
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that 
“browse-wrap” licenses did not “provide adequate notice either that a contract is being created or 
that the [TOU] will bind the user”). 
 25. “A CAPTCHA is a program that protects websites against bots by generating and 
grading tests that humans can pass but current computer programs cannot.” CAPTCHA: Telling 
Humans and Computers Apart Automatically, CAPTCHA, http://www.captcha.net (last visited 
June 27, 2015). 
 26. Ticketmaster, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 1102–03. 
 27. Id. at 1113. However, since Ticketmaster alleged no facts showing that it had suffered 
at least $5000 of harm (as required under § 1030(a)(4)), the court ultimately denied the motion. 
Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2012).  
 30. eBay Inc. v. Digital Point Solutions, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 31. Id.  
 32. According to the complaint, “While the exact method used by Defendants is unknown, 
eBay surmises that Defendants first placed software code on a web user’s computer 
surreptitiously, without the user’s knowledge. The software code then directed the user’s browser 
to eBay’s website, without the user’s knowledge or any affirmative action on the part of the user.” 
(paraphrasing the complaint) Id. (citation omitted). 
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permitted access.33 Defendant Digital Point Solutions launched into a 
refrain common among CFAA defendants: The plaintiff’s website was 
not a “protected computer” within the meaning of the CFAA, and no 
“unauthorized access” occurred because “eBay is a public website that 
may be accessed by anyone.”34 eBay countered that such access and use 
of the site were outside the scope of eBay’s TOU, and the defendant’s 
“only purpose [in accessing the site] was to defraud eBay.”35 The court 
appeared satisfied with eBay’s “purpose” argument and saved the CFAA 
claim from the defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion.36  
A year later, Craigslist brought suit in the Northern District of 
California against Naturemarket, Inc., a company in the business of 
selling automated ad posting software.37 According to the defendant, its 
software “makes the difficult Craigslist posting process child’s play and 
helps you manage and multi-post your ads.”38 Predictably, Craigslist was 
none too pleased. Craigslist argued that the defendant’s software 
facilitated automated access that both violated the site’s TOU and 
circumvented the site’s CAPTCHA software.39 The court held that these 
facts as alleged were sufficient to maintain the CFAA claim.40 
Apart from the differences in the precise technologies employed to 
“access” the plaintiffs’ websites, these cases have one thing in common: 
violating a site’s TOU appeared to per se constitute “unauthorized 
access” or activity “exceeding authorized access” under the first prong of 
§ 1030(a)(4). Whether these TOUs bound users in a legally significant 
way apart from § 1030 appeared largely beside the point. 
This all changed when the Ninth Circuit finally weighed in on the 
precise effect of the phrases “unauthorized access” and “exceeds 
unauthorized access” in CFAA civil claims. Before the pivotal United 
States v. Nosal, the Ninth Circuit first had occasion in LVRC Holdings 
LLC v. Brekka41 to engage in a “plain language” analysis of the CFAA’s 
operative provisions.42 The problem was seemingly that there was a 
fraught distinction between “access” and “use,” where parties (and 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1164 (emphasis added). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 38. Id. at 1049 (quoting Answer at 14, Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (No. CV 
08-5065 PJH)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Id. at 1050.  
 40. Id. at 1057. 
 41.  581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 42. Id. at 1132. 
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courts) had consistently conflated the latter with the former.43 In Brekka, 
the defendant accessed his employer’s computer system, and then saved 
and transmitted the data.44 Once his employer terminated his 
employment, the defendant continued to access his employer’s site.45 The 
court declined to find that one who uses information freely accessed on a 
computer system contrary to its owner’s best interest has “exceeded 
authorized access” within the meaning of § 1030(a)(4). Regarding the 
statute’s plain meaning, the court explained:  
This leads to a sensible interpretation of §§ 1030(a)(2) and 
(4), which gives effect to both the phrase “without 
authorization” and the phrase “exceeds authorized access”: 
a person who “intentionally accesses a computer without 
authorization” accesses a computer without any permission 
at all, while a person who “exceeds authorized access” has 
permission to access the computer, but accesses information 
on the computer that the person is not entitled to access.46 
In other words, the court held that it was legally insignificant under 
the CFAA whether the employee, with access freely given, put the 
information gathered to some nefarious end, or similarly, possessed a 
disloyal state of mind while freely accessing his employer’s computer.47 
Ultimately, the court held that the defendant did not violate the CFAA 
either before or after his term of employment.48 Brekka is important 
because it was the first case in California to constrain what had been an 
expansive reading of § 1030(a)(4), and though it addressed rather broadly 
a company policy restricting or placing limits on computer access, it did 
not explicitly address TOUs.  
United States v. Nosal49 finally closed that gap. In Nosal, the court 
reinforced Brekka’s interpretation of §§ 1030(a)(4) and (6) and waxed 
expansive about the sheer absurdity that would result from adopting the 
contract-based approach to CFAA liability50—i.e., treating breaches of 
sites’ TOUs as per se “unauthorized access,” which had ruled the day in 
the Ninth Circuit. Put simply, similar to an employer’s policy of granting 
broad computer access but restricting certain uses, a site’s TOU could not 
                                                                                                                     
 43. See id. at 1133 (explaining that “[i]t is the employer’s decision to allow or to terminate 
an employee’s authorization . . . that determines whether the employee is with or ‘without 
authorization’”). 
 44. Id. at 1130. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1133 (citations omitted). 
 47. See id. (holding that the mental state of the user who lacked authorization is an 
unpersuasive interpretation of §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4)). 
 48. Id. at 1137. 
 49. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 50. Id. at 861–62.  
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serve as an actual limitation on access if the website otherwise freely gave 
access to users.51 Reinforcing the “plain meaning” principle articulated 
in Brekka, the court held that restrictions on “use” must not be conflated 
with “access” for purposes of determining CFAA liability.52  
The court then illustrated a series of scenarios where to hold otherwise 
would result in an unacceptable expansion of criminal and civil liability 
under the CFAA.53 The court arguably takes this riff reductio ad 
absurdum, but the basic point is clear: “Our access to [websites] is 
governed by a series of private agreements and policies that most people 
are only dimly aware of and virtually no one reads or understands”—a 
nod perhaps to the line of cases that declined to recognize enforceable 
agreements by way of TOUs as a separate matter.54 Since most websites’ 
TOUs deal with restrictions on use of the website and proprietary data 
hosted therein, “[i]f Congress wants to incorporate misappropriation 
liability into the CFAA, it must speak more clearly.”55 Though the court 
made a sweeping policy appeal, its reasoning was grounded in a well-trod 
principle: the plain meaning of “unauthorized access” does not and 
cannot contemplate a website’s imposed restrictions on use. 
Several cases have followed Nosal and applied this more exacting 
standard based on the tighter interpretation of § 1030(a)(4).56 The 
newfangled standard necessarily requires a more fact-intensive inquiry—
no longer would violations of a website’s TOU automatically trigger 
liability under the CFAA. Removing TOUs from the equation, the court 
must now determine, among other things, whether and by what means the 
website blocked or restricted access;57 whether the website granted access 
for certain areas of a site or database but not others; and whether a would-
be intruder’s “purpose” in accessing a site is relevant at all. The Nosal 
case is notable for not listing any types of affirmative steps a website 
could take to block access that it otherwise freely gives, and as a result, 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Id. at 862–63.  
 52. Id. at 863.  
 53. See id. at 860–63 (discussing issues of TOU breaches regarding Facebook, eHarmony, 
and MySpace that did not result in violations of the CFAA). 
 54. Id. at 861. 
 55. Id. at 863. 
 56. E.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Steele Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00784-MCE-DAD, 
2013 WL 3872950, at *20 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (granting motion to dismiss on other grounds, 
but finding that plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to show defendant had “exceeded authorized 
access” by using others’ login credentials to access computer for which his access was restricted). 
 57. One case decided between Brekka and Noral suggested that only “technical barriers” 
could effectively restrict access, the circumvention of which would constitute “unauthorized 
access.” Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750, at *12 
(N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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the contours of the doctrine prior to Craigslist Inc. v. 3Tap Inc. were still 
rather blurred.  
II.  CRAIGSLIST INC. V. 3TAPS INC.: HOW THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA GOT IT WRONG AND WHY THIS MATTERS 
While the litigation is ongoing, a few preliminary decisions from the 
Northern District of California in the Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc. 
controversy have arguably set the tenor and tone should the case 
eventually reach trial or a summary judgment motion. In Craigslist, the 
three named defendants engaged in the practice of “scraping” Craigslist’s 
servers for user-generated listings that they would then repackage for 
other third parties to use.58 Web scraping—also known as “screen 
scraping” or “web harvesting”—commonly utilizes software to copy data 
from websites in bulk via an automated process, in effect bypassing the 
time limitations a single user would encounter when extracting and 
copying such data.59 In Craigslist, defendants Padmapper, 3Taps, and 
Lovely each employed web scraping processes to extract and republish 
ad listings from Craigslist’s website.60 
Craigslist responded by sending multiple cease-and-desist letters to 
the defendants, as well as by engaging “IP blockers” to selectively bar 
access from defendants’ computers.61 The court ultimately found that, 
even in light of Norsal, Craigslist had alleged facts that were sufficient to 
withstand a 12(b)(6) motion.62  
A few things are troubling about the court’s reasoning. First, when 
addressing TOUs in the April 2013 Craigslist order, the court announced 
that “[t]he relationship between a website’s terms of use and the CFAA 
is somewhat unclear in light of Nosal.”63 The court suggests that Nosal 
makes an assumption that TOUs will necessarily involve restrictions on 
use only,64 which may very well be a correct reading of the case. 
Admittedly, Nosal does not draw a clear line between its indictment of 
TOUs and the “use/access” distinction on which its ultimate opinion 
rested, but it is a fair inference that, by definition website TOUs deal only 
with use. However, reading Nosal one gets a sense that, all “plain 
meaning” aside, the court desired to lay to rest the notion that contractual 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 59. See What Is Web Scraping?, WEBHARVY, https://www.webharvy.com/articles/what-is-
web-scraping.html (last visited June 27, 2015) (website offering web scraping software); see also 
Zachary Levine, FAQS, 12 E-COMMERCE L. REP., no. 10, at 18 (2010) (defining web scraping as 
“a form of data mining where a program, or person, scours the web making copies of data found 
on target Web sites”). 
 60. Craigslist, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 966. 
 61. Id. at 969. 
 62. See id. at 969–70. 
 63. Id. at 968.  
 64. Id. at 969.  
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liability could work as a stand-in for CFAA liability. Indeed, maybe 
Nosal is clearer than people think; and further, maybe a repudiation of 
the contract-based approach to the CFAA coincides with the Ninth 
Circuit’s plain-meaning interpretation of “unauthorized access.” The line 
from Craigslist is ultimately a throwaway, but it highlights courts’ 
continued confusion over CFAA doctrine. Until a court is faced with 
website TOUs that purport to restrict access, the matter will remain 
unsettled. 
The August 2013 Craigslist order is perhaps more illuminating on 
these points and suggests that the use/access comparison may ultimately 
be a distinction without a difference. Here, the court artfully distinguished 
Nosal from the instant case by explaining that the former clearly involved 
restrictions on use, while the latter involved revoking access by way of 
technological barriers and cease-and-desist letters.65 3Taps responded 
that this characterization (as was common in pre-Nosal decisions) 
conflates access with use, and that Craigslist’s measures to block access 
were thinly-veiled use restrictions after all—Craigslist banned access for 
certain users based solely on how those users would put the scraped data 
to use.66 While the court rejected this argument, it may pay to take heed 
because it raises an important question: Do not all access restrictions 
become use restrictions when dealing with data from a website that grants 
broad access to the public at large? In other words, in this environment, 
are not access restrictions applied to specific users necessarily to prevent 
certain types of uses? Otherwise, why discriminate among users when all 
users enjoy full access by default? 
Secondly, the court gives legal significance to the cease-and-desist 
letters Craigslist sent the defendants.67 The court is right to point out that 
there are conflicting holdings in the Northern District regarding whether 
defiance of a cease-and-desist letter—where permission to access a site 
is affirmatively withheld—constitutes unauthorized access.68 The court 
is wrong, however, to take the position that per Nosal, technological or 
otherwise physical barriers are no different from softer barriers, such as 
a cease-and-desist letter or a contractual provision. This betrays the spirit 
of Nosal, which subscribed to the canon of lenity in interpreting the 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 66. Id. at 1184–85. 
 67. See Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969–70 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 68. Compare Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780 JW, 2010 WL 
3291750, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (finding that cease and deist letters do not abrogate 
permission for the purposes of the CFAA), with Weingand v. Harland Fin. Solutions, Inc., No. C 
11-3109 EMC, 2012 WL 2327660, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) (holding that the CFAA applies 
to all restrictions on access).  
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CFAA, a criminal statute first and foremost.69 Therefore, an 
interpretation that would result in citizens having “fair notice of the 
criminal laws . . . [and] Congress hav[ing] fair notice of what conduct its 
laws criminalize” necessarily must exclude TOUs or other “soft” 
measures to restrict access within the meaning of the CFAA.70 To echo 
the Ninth Circuit in Nosal, if Congress wished to include violations of 
cease-and-desist letters in the definition of “exceeds authorized access,” 
then it should have done so. At least one commentator has weighed in, 
noting that it would indeed be unprecedented to give these “unregulated 
wish lists” such sweeping legal effect.71 
Finally, the plaintiff’s utilization of IP blockers poses a thornier 
problem. These measures more closely resemble the “physical” 
technological barriers to access, whose circumvention the court 
suggested would constitute unauthorized access under the CFAA. 
However, far from the bulwark that Craigslist and the court seem to 
ascribe to IP blockers, these barriers often amount to a mere “No 
Trespassing” sign, offering little or no protection against unwanted 
intrusion.72 Both orders suggest that circumvention of a technological 
barrier would constitute “unauthorized access,” and such a rule seems 
sensible. But, as several commentators have pointed out, it is not readily 
clear that IP address blockers present such a “barrier,” and the Northern 
District shirked from this analysis.73 Unlike a more conventional barrier 
(such as data encryption or passwords), users can easily avoid IP address 
blockers by either changing the IP address or simply accessing the 
Internet from a different computer.74 In this sense, an IP blocker works 
as a technological barrier only “in the very short term but not in the long 
                                                                                                                     
 69. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing issues of TOU 
breaches regarding YouTube, eHarmony, and MySpace that did not result in violations of the 
CFAA). 
 70. Id. at 863. 
 71. Eric Goldman, Craigslist Wins Routine but Troubling Online Trespass to Chattels 
Ruling in 3Taps Case (Catch-up Post), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/09/craigslist_wins_1.htm (“This is one of the reasons 
why I favor threats actions, so that senders of overclaiming C&D letters feel some legal risk before 
they pop off. Because C&D letters are effectively unregulated wish lists, it’s troubling to see 
courts treat them as relevant to the legal conclusion.”). 
 72. See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, US Court Rules Masking IP Address to Access Blocked 
Website Violates Law, ZDNET (Aug. 21, 2013, 9:30 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/us-court-rules-
masking-ip-address-to-access-blocked-website-violates-law-7000019701. 
 73. See Orin Kerr, District Court Holds That Intentionally Circumventing IP Address Ban 
Is “Access Without Authorization” Under the CFAA, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 18, 2013, 7:40 
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/18/district-court-holds-that-intentionally-
circumventing-ip-address-block-is-unauthorized-access-under-the-cfaa; Vaughan-Nichols, 
supra note 72. 
 74. See Kerr, supra note 73. 
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term,”75 and would seem to share more in common with the softer cease 
and desist letter or TOU provision in this regard—a measure more 
symbolic than functional, perhaps evincing a website’s intent76 to ban 
access without effectively doing so. This begs the question of whether 
any type of technological barrier could effectively ban access in a web 
environment that is so pervasively “open” to begin with.  
The apparent follies in the court’s reasoning are less evidence of a 
misapplication of Nosal and more a symptom of the doctrinal mess that 
the CFAA has become in California. The Craigslist decisions illustrate 
that Nosal’s rejiggering of the “without authorization” standard, while 
producing some clarity, has left lower courts with (1) a use/access 
distinction that is conceptually fraught, especially in the public website 
context; (2) little guidance as to which types of technological barriers 
whose circumvention would trigger CFAA liability; and (3) whether 
TOUs may ever impose access restrictions, and if so, whether this could 
be reconciled with Nosal’s holding regarding TOU violations. Simply, 
the CFAA is not well-adapted for this type of interpretative jerry-rigging. 
It is time that Congress revisit the CFAA in light of new changes in 
the technological landscape and developments in “cyberculture.” Courts 
must not be continually tasked (and taxed) with adapting old doctrine to 
emerging trends in technology, which results in unpredictable and 
inconsistent outcomes. The court’s decision may have only postponed the 
doomsday scenario the Nosal court described—visions of unchecked 
CFAA liability in a digital world governed by obscure, one-sided TOUs. 
A statutory solution is required to prevent websites from using the CFAA 
to snuff out their competitors. When evaluating 3Taps’s argument that 
public websites cannot effectively revoke authorization, the court 
suggested that there comes a point where the court’s interpretation of 
§ 1030 breaks down and it must defer to the plain meaning of the text: 
“Congress apparently knew how to restrict the reach of the CFAA to only 
certain kinds of information, and it appreciated the public vs. nonpublic 
distinction—but § 1030(a)(2)(c) contains no such restrictions or 
modifiers.”77 Indeed, until the statute explicitly exempts from the scope 
                                                                                                                     
 75. Id. 
 76. While it is outside the scope of this analysis, Professor Orin Kerr makes an interesting 
observation regarding the August 2013 Craigslist order:  
So whatever unauthorized access means, the person must be guilty of doing that 
thing (the act of unauthorized access) intentionally to trigger the statute. Judge 
[Charles] Breyer  seems to mix up those elements by focusing heavily on the fact 
that 3taps knew that Craigslist didn’t want 3taps to access its site. According to 
Judge Breyer, the clear notice meant that the case before him didn’t raise all the 
notice and vagueness issues that prompted the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nosal.  
Id. 
 77. Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1182–83 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
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of liability information on websites freely accessible and open to the 
public, this will continue to be a losing argument for defendants. 
III.  THE STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR 
Before addressing a proper statutory fix that would reduce the 
CFAA’s use as an expansive right of private enforcement, a brief 
comparison to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)78 might 
be instructive. In 1998, Congress enacted the DMCA with the objective 
of “facilitat[ing] the robust development and worldwide expansion of 
electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and 
education . . . . [while adapting the current law] in order to make digital 
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials.”79 
Consistent with this goal as well as in order to foster new creation and 
growth of internet industries, Congress felt it necessary to free online 
service providers from the litigious grip that content owners might 
impose on them, especially when third parties conducted infringing 
activity.80 What followed was the creation of four statutory “safe 
harbors,”81 which were aimed at exempting from liability certain 
activities that had erstwhile been actionable under common law theories 
of secondary copyright infringement. In sum, the DMCA safe harbors 
attempted to adapt the law to the realities of the market and new 
developments in technology. Technology had simply outpaced these 
common law doctrines, and Congress recognized that courts could no 
longer reliably stretch doctrine to cover unanticipated changes in 
technology (namely, the Internet as a medium for copying and 
transmitting copyrighted content). 
Similarly, the CFAA is due for a safe harbor of its own given the 
“current broad reach of the CFAA . . . [that] impacts . . . innovation, 
competition, and the general ‘openness’ of the internet.”82 The CFAA did 
not envisage the Internet as it exists currently, where users may freely 
connect with a multitude of servers—which themselves are connected 
with other servers—and where the notion of “access” lacks any real 
significance. The legislative history of the CFAA reveals a core 
preoccupation with the protection of “computer systems” generally not 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 5, 17, 28, 35 U.S.C.). 
 79. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at *1–2 (1998). 
 80. See Liliana Chang, Recent Development, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge 
Under the DMCA § 512(c) Safe Harbor, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 198 (2010). 
 81. The four DMCA safe harbors cover the following categories of material: (1) digital 
transmissions, (2) temporary system caching, (3) content residing on a system or network at the 
user’s direction, and (4) information location tools. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012). 
 82. Craigslist, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (citing Reply Brief for Defendant at 15, Craigslist, 
964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (No. CV-12-03816 CRB)). 
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open to public83 (this was 1986, after all). However, as Craigslist points 
out, the CFAA does draw a distinction between public and nonpublic 
systems and information housed therein, but this distinction was not 
based on an understanding of “public” as people now understand and 
experience the Internet. Thus, it seems clear that the CFAA considered 
treating different categories of information differently for purposes of 
establishing CFAA liability; it seems equally clear that had the drafters 
understood the intrinsically open character of the Internet as it exists 
today, they would have likely limited or restricted liability when it came 
to access—authorized or not. 
In its reply brief, 3Taps draws the court’s attention to such a limitation 
found in the Stored Communications Act (SCA):84 “It shall not be 
unlawful under this [law] for any person to intercept or access an 
electronic communication made through an electronic communication 
system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily 
accessible to the general public.”85 3Taps proposed that, due to the 
striking, policy-based similarities between the CFAA and SCA, the court 
should import this limitation into the CFAA.86 Not surprisingly, the court 
declined such an invitation, but the implications are clear. Congress 
should amend the CFAA to include this general limitation on liability, 
and it should thus read: “It shall not be unlawful for any person to access 
data housed on a computer system where such system is readily 
accessible to the general public.” At present, the CFAA portends of “a 
permission-based regime for public websites” where permission freely 
given could be instantly revoked, with or without notice, upon the 
whimsy or caprice of public websites.87 Such a safe harbor would once 
and for all restrict liability for user activity in the web environment, 
including the web scraping and data aggregation at issue in Craigslist.  
There are undoubtedly instances where the means employed to cull 
data for public websites would legitimately impede or interfere with the 
target computer system, and there are certainly defendants who would not 
readily fit the “brave innovator” mold that commentators have ascribed 
to companies such as 3Taps and Padmapper. However, ample causes of 
action exist—from copyright infringement to unfair competition—for 
website owners to properly respond to less scrupulous activity. But the 
CFAA should, once and for all, be cast from plaintiffs’ arsenal. 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See Senate Report, supra note 12, at 3. 
 84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 86. Craigslist, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. 
 87. Id. at 1184 (quoting Defendant’s Supplemental Briefing re: Motion to Dismiss Causes 
of Action Nos. 13 & 14 in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 13, Craigslist, 964 F. Supp. 2d 
1178 (No. CV-12-03816 CRB)). 
15
Splichal: Recent Development: Craigslist and the CFAA: The Untold Story
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1860 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
CONCLUSION 
While it remains uncertain how the Northern District of California 
will handle the § 1030 issue on the merits,88 the early signs weigh heavily 
in Craigslist’s favor. It is likely that the parties will draw out litigation to 
the extent that 3Taps and others’ resources are depleted and the case 
ultimately settles. Until there is legislative intervention, parties will 
continue to engage in pitched battles over application and construction of 
the CFAA—a statute that has outlived its usefulness and demands 
strained interpretations to reach activity that it obviously never 
contemplated.  
                                                                                                                     
 88. On October 1, 2013, the court referred the case to a federal magistrate judge for 
discovery. Since then, the matter remains in the discovery phase, with the last filing on the docket 
occurring on March 19, 2015. Craigslist, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (No. 3:12-CV-03816). 
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